Georg Brun: Logical Analysis of Arguments: Aspects of Adequacy
Two issues have been prominent in discussions about what makes for an adequate logical analysis of arguments. How can we defend a formal explication of the pre-theoretical notion(s) of logical consequence? What are the criteria of adequacy for formalizations of arguments in a given system of formal deductive logic? There are, however, many more aspects of adequacy. On the one hand, logical analysis is not restricted to the notion of logical consequence and the formalization of individual arguments but, for example, includes aspects of text-analysis, extends to complex argumentation and debates, and covers deductive as well as non-deductive arguments. On the other hand, the adequacy of logical reconstructions is relative to the goals that drive the logical analysis and must be judged in light of hermeneutical principles and an ideal of clarification. The presentation will first give a systematic overview of various aspects of adequacy. I will then investigate in a case study some strategies for deductivist reconstructions of non-deductive arguments and evaluate them with respect to various criteria of adequacy. The results underline the importance of the often neglected perspective of the analysis of complex argumentation.
Roy T. Cook: Logic, Counterexamples, and Translation
Arguments for logical revision typically proceed (roughly) as follows: First, we translate some argument into a formal language, and then we argue that this formal argument cannot be valid, hence we must adopt some logic in which the argument form is invalid. Using Putnam's classic argument for quantum logic as a case study, I show that this methodology is fundamentally flawed. The upshot is that translation from natural language to formal language is logic-dependent, and hence the adoption of a different (typically non-classical) logic might force us to re-evaluate the best translations of problematic claims. I conclude with some general observations on how this point affects our understanding of meaning within formal logics.
Michael Glanzberg: Logic and Logics in Natural Language
In earlier work, I argued that on a narrow conception of logic, we do not find logical consequence in natural language, while on a more permissive conception of logic, the connection between logical consequence and natural language becomes trivial. I also argued that we can find consequence relations by abstracting away from important structure in natural language. In this paper, I ask about the place of nonclassical logics in this picture. I argue that if we take a permissive view, we can find in natural language a very broad range of logics, including subclassical and substructural logics. However, a number of these examples involve using logics to model relations other than consequence. If we focus on consequence, a more limited range of options is available. But this range is still wide enough to include subclassical options.
Gil Sagi: Some General Considerations on Logic and Natural Language
Most of the contemporary research in logic is carried out with respect to formal, mathematical, languages. Logic, however, is said to be concerned with correct reasoning, and it is natural language that we usually reason in. Can logic keep its promise in the realm where its motivation originates? On the one hand, we have formal semanticists who study the logic of natural language, assuming it exists. On the other hand, some philosophers have denied that there is a logical consequence relation in natural language. In this talk I will look at the relation between logic and natural language from the most general perspective, assuming about either as little as possible. I will draw from the works of Frege, Carnap, Chomsky, Glanzberg, Steinberger and others.
Alexandra Zinke: Beyond Formality
I argue that the desideratum of formality cannot play any substantial role in the definition of logical truth or logical consequence. In the Tarskian tradition, logical truth is defined as truth under all interpretations of the non-logical terms. We cannot, however, take into account literally all interpretations, but have to impose further constraints, e.g. grammatical constraints and uniformity constraints. The talk contrasts the role of these constraints on interpretations for formal language and for natural language. It then argues that formality cannot serve in identifying the admissible interpretations on pain of a vicious circularity: the scope of formal truth depends on the same factors as does the scope of admissible interpretations. I will end with discussing some consequences of this result.